PRESERVING THE PERSON
A Look at the Human Sciences

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way will apply this dialectical method to problems posed at the interface of science and religion. He will not ignore the data of biblical revelation, nor will he slight the general revelation provided through science and reflection on human experience. Nor will he simply add these two together. He will strive to understand the findings of science within the context of a biblical worldview. This may in some cases (but only some) even affect how science itself is "done." In terms of Toulmin or Kuhn, the Christian will probably find some paradigms in the social sciences more plausible and consistent with his world view than others.

But the dialogue goes in the other direction too. Understanding deepens and modifies faith. The redemptive thinker will also strive to interpret the biblical revelation in a way which is consistent with scientific truth. A commitment to the authority of Scripture does not entail a commitment to the infallibility of human exegesis and hermeneutics. Thus even where Scripture explicitly speaks about human nature, it is possible for scientific advances to deepen and modify our understanding of scriptural teachings.

**in the image of God**

From this perspective, in order to think Christianly about our original question—how to resolve the problem of the person—it is essential to reflect seriously on the biblical data. What is the biblical view of man? (Of course, here and throughout this discussion I mean man as male and female.) It is obvious that no really adequate answer to such a question can be given in a few paragraphs. What I shall attempt is therefore by no means a well-worked-out, comprehensive review of the biblical account. I shall simply try to sketch out what seem to me to be the major features of the biblical picture. If you will, I am attempting to assemble some "reminders" of biblical teachings so fundamental that any account of the person which presumes to be Christian must pay attention to them.

First and foremost, the biblical view of man begins with God. Although our human limitations require us, no doubt legitimately, to conceive of a personal God in terms of our familiar experience of finite persons, there is no doubt that an adequate understanding of man proceeds from an understanding of God, rather than vice versa. The Bible begins with God and his creative activity and ends with the culmination of God's redemptive activity. Everywhere in between, God as providential Creator and Redeemer is constantly in evidence. Hence the first "reminder" we must emphasize is simply that human beings are a creation of God. Both man's nature and destiny must therefore be understood as rooted in God's creative activity and purposes. This must be understood as implying not simply that God originated human existence (although this is significant) but that the relationship of man to God is one of continual dependence. Apart from God's creative power and activity man is literally nothing.

As a created being, man must be understood as a creature. In his creatureliness he is at one with the rest of God's creation. "Then the LORD God formed a man from the dust of the ground" (Gen. 2:7). In Genesis 3:19, the Lord tells Adam that he was taken from the ground: "Dust you are, to dust you shall return." No Christian view of man can afford to ignore the fact that man is solidly part of nature. That man is dust, a bodily creature, makes this especially evident. It is bodily existence which serves as a forceful reminder of man's general creatureliness and the limitations which go with that status.

Man is, however, not merely a creature but a very special type of creature, and it is here that the biblical emphasis falls: "Then God said, 'Let us make man in our image and likeness. . . . So God created man in his own image . . . " (Gen. 1:26-27). Creatureliness refers to all those ways in which man is essentially different from God. The *imago Dei* refers to those ways in which man nevertheless resembles God. It is these aspects which demarcate man as a personal being, and it is to them we must pay special attention.

The Genesis account does not tell us what the image of God consists of. Much debate has been expended in determining whether the image of God refers to man's rational capacities, or moral capacities, or social capacities, or a moral and social capacities and so forth. However, it seems plausible to me that all of these capacities are interrelated in the most complicated way, and that it is therefore a mistake to identify the *imago Dei* with one of them. For example, the ability to love another person certainly presupposes the ability consciously to recognize that person. It seems to me that the image of God con-
sists of that complex unity of activities which are distinctively and uniquely human. These activities must not only be unique to man in the created order; they must also be God-like in the literal sense of resembling those activities through which God has made himself known. Probably no completely adequate account of these special created human capacities can be given. No list will completely escape the charges of failing to be exhaustive and/or being redundant in some respects. The following, however, is my attempt.

Central to the image of God is the concept of action. God is a God who does things, who makes decisions in accordance with his plans and purposes and carries them out. Similarly human beings are first and foremost agents. Their lives do not consist merely of a string of happenings or events, but constitute a series of choices and decisions about what they will do. As agents, humans possess an essential unity. They are not to be conceived as a series of isolated or disconnected events but as self-shaping beings who bear the consequences of previous choices and strive to achieve future ideals. The concept of an agent is not the concept of a part but the concept of the self as a unified whole. This unified wholeness is pre-eminent and takes precedence over whatever account is given of “body, soul and spirit.”

To this concept of man as agent a list of very important qualifying adjectives must be added: purposive, valuing, rational, morally responsible, social, passionate, creative and no doubt others. To understand actions one must understand the purposes and intentions which these acts express. These purposes are many and various; they certainly include God’s command to exercise dominion over the rest of the created order: “Be fruitful and increase, fill the earth and subdue it, rule over the fish in the sea, the birds of heaven, and every living thing that moves upon the earth” (Gen. 1:28). These purposes are rooted in what a person values—what he wants, loves and hopes. A valuing agent is necessarily a rational being who has the power both to review and evaluate the worth of alternative courses of action and attempt to calculate the probable outcome of these alternatives by gaining knowledge of the causal mechanisms of nature. Biblical man is not seen as a totally autonomous valuing agent, however, but one called to be-

have in accordance with God-given values and principles. As such he is morally responsible.

Nor is biblical man a self-sufficient, isolated agent. Though he is an individual agent, he is bound up in social relationships in a twofold way. First, he is a creature with social needs, born to live in community: “It is not good for the man to be alone” (Gen. 2:18). Second, his very character and personality are shaped by his social relationships and their character and quality. This is so from the very outset. In the Genesis story, man breaks his relationship to God and his own character is fundamentally altered. As a further consequence Cain destroys his brotherly relationship to Abel and further degrades his character. The Bible is very far from ignoring the pervasive effects of social relationships on the character and being of the individual. Thus the Scriptures have a strong sense of family solidarity, national solidarity, even the solidarity of the human race. Real concrete human beings are involved with other human beings, and it is impossible to give an account of what it is to be human or how a particular human got to be the way he is without holding these involvements in clear view.

Nevertheless, it is all-important how these relationships are viewed. No one chooses to be born to a particular family or economic group or nation. These classifications represent events which “happen to” people. Nevertheless, the Bible never views a person purely as a passive product of these social roles. He is still, in the midst of these roles, a responsible agent. He becomes what he becomes in the context of these social roles which tremendously limit and weight his options as an agent. Nevertheless, as a rational, responsible agent, he is not merely formed by these social relationships; he acts and by acting helps to form these roles in turn. He is not only constituted by these relationships; he himself constitutes them. He plays a role in continuing them, modifying them for better or worse, enhancing or degrading their quality and character.

In all of these contexts human beings are creative. We are not here talking simply of “the arts” as a distinct area of human endeavor, although what is generally referred to as the arts is a striking manifestation of human creativity. We are rather claim-
ing that man has the ability to act creatively and imaginatively in every sphere of human endeavor from science to politics. Creativity and aesthetic sensitivity are not mere additions to humanness; they lie at the very core of the concept. It is no accident that God's fundamental activity is that of creation and that the Greek word for creator (poietes) is the root of our English word "poet."

This account of the *imago Dei* is an attempt at representing what is essential to man as a special type of creature. As such it is an "ideal" account. But the biblical record is far from simply an ideal description. It is fundamentally historical. That is, it gives a clear and realistic record of how human beings have actually acted. It does not merely describe man as an agent with the power to choose, but centers on how man has employed that power. Therefore, from a biblical view, although it is important not to view sin as essential to man's being (in that case it becomes a metaphysical necessity, not a moral choice), it is equally important to understand actual concrete man as sinful, in rebellion against God. This sinfulness affects every aspect of the *imago Dei* which we considered.

There is hardly any Christian doctrine more difficult to understand theoretically than the doctrine of "original sin," yet there is hardly any doctrine which seems to have such massive experiential support. The scriptural account of sin is neither mechanistic nor individualistic. It does not regard sin as something which "happens to" a person, nor does it view the individual as a monad who starts with a "fresh slate," uncorrupted by the actions and consequences of actions of his ancestors and the contemporary social environment. Since the Bible has a strong sense of the social unity of man, it is logical that it sees the choices of individuals as having an effect on the larger community. Since the Scripture shows that God has a genuine respect for the integrity of human choice, it is not surprising that the consequences of these choices are allowed full reign, even when these consequences affect others who may be innocent. But sin, like man's social relationships, is never viewed simply as an event which "happens to" people. Human beings are viewed as active and accountable participants in sin. The dialectical view which we saw as charac-

terizing the relationship of the individual to his social environment is present here too. The individual is formed and shaped by sin, which is "original." But he is not a mere product; he is an active, responsible participant in the process.

This account of man as "fallen" provides the context for the decisive redemptive act of God. The biblical picture is that though man is in rebellion against God and does not seek God, God continues lovingly to seek man. The Bible records God's loving attempts to redeem and restore man to his intended place of fellowship with God, climaxing by God's own entry into history. To restore his fallen creatures, God became a human being. He lived and worked among the poor, proclaiming the good news of God's salvation. Dying an innocent death, he rose from the dead to proclaim God's victory over sin and death. Scripture proclaims that through union with Christ, God offers forgiveness and new life to those who repent and affirm Christ as the Lord of their lives.

The new life which a person is promised in Christ is described as "eternal." This concept is not purely quantitative; it does not refer simply to immortality but to a new quality of being that begins here and now. The concept of victory over death is included though. In promising human beings eternal life, God affirms that human beings are intended to have an eternal destiny. The process of creative growth which begins in a man's here-and-now actions does not lead to a dead end.

The Christian concept of "victory over death" is not, of course, equivalent to disembodied existence. The eternal life which is man's intended destiny is a bodily existence. People are made as bodily creatures, and nowhere in Scripture is there any indication that this state is inherently undesirable or is ultimately to be abandoned (although there is much vexation over the problems and limitations connected with our present bodies, marred by the Fall). The resurrection of the body is a pivotal Christian doctrine because it makes clear how intimately unified a person is with his body. That this is so should be neither surprising nor disturbing. After all, God made matter, and he chose to make human beings material creatures. Since human beings are physical creatures, God's salvation would be incomplete were it not for the resurrection of the body.
biblical dualism or biblical monism

This is perhaps an appropriate time to say something of the biblical notions of "soul" and "spirit" and their relationship to the body. Those who have criticized the way dualistic Christians have read into these terms Platonic or Cartesian meanings have a point. The primary biblical emphasis is on the person as a unified agent. In Genesis God does not add a soul to a body to make a person. Rather God breathes on the physical creature and he (the whole person) "became a living soul" (Gen. 2:7, ASV). Soul here refers to a set of capacities—a quality or special mode of existence. The word spirit is generally used in a similar way. That is soul and spirit do not generally refer to "parts" of the person but to the whole person, with special reference to particular capacities which the person possesses. I shall not attempt to say which capacities are "soulish" and which are "spiritual" because I am not sure that the various biblical writers are consistent in their usage. It should be noted that spiritual does not denote "nonphysical" as it does in contemporary philosophical parlance. (And of course the biblical concept of "the flesh" which wars against the spirit is not the concept of the body warring against the soul, but the concept of a conflict between two different types of desires.)

Having said so much against the dualist reading of Scripture, something must be said against some of the contemporary critics of dualism. The fact that an idea is Greek in origin does not entail its falsity. Those who wish to deny dualism must forthrightly tackle the resulting problems when dealing with life after death and the continued identity of the individual. Actually it seems to me that the Bible neither precludes nor demands dualism. The Bible does not equate the person with the soul or the soul and spirit. The person is the whole man. Neither does the Bible claim that the capacities designated soul and spirit are completely nonexistent apart from the body. Hence those who regard the idea of a separable soul as a Platonic intrusion upon the Bible cannot claim that Scripture validates their position. The Bible's central thrust is the unity of the whole person as a spiritual bodily creature. (Biblically this does not involve any contradiction.) Hence the emphasis is on the resurrection. But the Bible certainly does not rule out, indeed it seems to teach, some form of continued existence in the period between physical death and the time of the resurrection. It is this continuation of existence after death which the dualist view of the soul as a separable entity is meant to explain. Hence dualism remains an option for the Christian thinker so long as the primary emphasis on the unity of the person is not disturbed.

However, the contemporary Christian thinker is not committed to dualism as his only option, at least not in its traditional forms. It should therefore be no special cause for alarm if future developments in science seem to cut against the dualistic view of the mind as a separate, nonphysical entity. The main strength of the Perspectivalist/Limiter of Science position lies here. This position admits—even stresses—the unity of the person. Thus the fact that a person may be in some sense identical with his body is no more cause for alarm than the fact that a poem may be in some sense identical with a set of ink marks is alarming to a poet.

of poems and persons

Imagine a poem that has been handwritten with a pen. In a sense the poem is just a set of ink marks. The "ink mark" description of the poem covers all of the poem. There are no parts which do not consist of ink marks. Nevertheless the person who views a poem simply as a set of ink marks is looking at the poem from a definite (and narrow) perspective. Someone else might see a collection of letters of the alphabet; another, an example of poor penmanship; another, a beautiful literary expression of profound emotion.

The key concept here is the concept of identity or sameness. When someone says that the poem is identical with the ink marks, if he means that the two are identical in a strict or absolute sense, his claim is obviously false. Not every property of the ink is also a property of the poem; nor is every property of the poem a property of the ink. Nevertheless, in ordinary life we find it useful to employ looser, weaker senses of identity. That is, we recognize one thing as the same as another if the two have some crucial set of characteristics in common, even if in other ways they differ. For example, a man may be said to be the same person he was five years ago, even though he has changed in significant ways and no longer has all the characteristics he possessed five years ago. It is this weaker
sense of identity which is being employed when the poem is viewed as identical with the ink marks. The common property which makes the identification plausible is spatio-temporal location. But the poem obviously is more than a set of ink marks; it is a rich, complex unity which can be described from a variety of perspectives.

In a similar way the Perspectivist wishes to argue that human persons are a complex, rich unity which can be viewed from a variety of perspectives. The fact that a person can be viewed as a body does not entail that a person is only a body. The concept of multiple perspectives on a unitary reality seems to make it possible to save the unity of the person, doing full justice to his bodily character, while avoiding the reductionist denial of personhood. However, when we discussed Perspectivism, we noted the problem of relating these pluralistic perspectives to each other. A critic might grant the possibility of plural perspectives and still claim that a reductionist kind of materialism is true because the physical description of the person is the perspective which is more ultimate or foundational. This criticism forces us to ask, "How does one go about determining the ultimacy of a perspective? Which level of description of an object has metaphysical primacy?"

I would offer two criteria to help resolve disputes between rival claimants to metaphysical ultimacy. One is the criterion of comprehensiveness. A perspective which can incorporate other perspectives in the sense that it presupposes these perspectives and then builds upon them seems more adequate than a perspective which cannot illuminate or make sense of any other. The second criterion is the criterion of uniqueness. That perspective seems most adequate which does the most justice to the unique aspects of the entity in question.

When these two criteria are applied to the handwritten poem, the results are interesting. The various levels of description of the poem which are possible seem to form a hierarchy. We noted the possibility of describing the poem in purely physical terms, as a set of ink marks on paper. This description could be made more sophisticated by substituting a chemical analysis of the ink and paper perhaps. Such a description of the poem could be extremely useful in certain circumstances. For example, someone who wished to know whether this poem would be likely to fade and become illegible over a period of time would find this knowledge invaluable. A second level of description would be to view the poem as a collection of letters of the English alphabet; a third would be to view the poem as a collection of English words. Finally someone might describe the poem as a literary creation. Thus we have the following five levels of description:

5. The poem viewed as a literary creation.
4. The poem viewed as words of the English alphabet.
3. The poem viewed as letters of the English alphabet.
2. The poem viewed as ink marks and paper.
1. Chemical description of the ink and paper.

In analyzing these perspectives, the question is not "Which is true?" because they are all possible true descriptions of what might be perceived. The poem is a collection of letters, words, ink marks or molecules, depending on the criterion of identity implicit in the particular perspective adopted. The crucial question is which of these levels of description has a better claim if the question of ultimacy is raised.

There is a sense in which the description of level 1 is "basic." This is I think the source of the appeal of reductionist materialism. Each level of description of the poem in a sense presupposes that some description of the poem can be given at level 1. But this by no means entails that the level-1 description is metaphysically ultimate. The truth is that, though the poem has a physical embodiment, there is no necessity for the particular embodiment which it happens to have. While certain physical descriptions may be ruled out (one cannot write with water), many others are allowed. The poem could be written with crayon or pencil. The paper could be vellum stationery or a yellow, lined legal pad.

When the two criteria of comprehensiveness and uniqueness are applied, the basis of my stratification of the perspectives becomes clearer. The "alphabet-letter" perspective is more comprehensive than level 2 since it incorporates the "ink-mark" perspective. It is generally known that letters (when written) are composed of a certain material and that ink is suitable for this purpose. Similarly, it is generally known that words are composed of letters and poems of words. In other words that perspective in which the
poem is seen as a poem, a literary creation, is most comprehensive. It incorporates all the other perspectives by presupposing them and going beyond them.

The perspective in which the poem is experienced as a poem also scores highest on the uniqueness criterion. There are molecules which do not form ink marks, there are ink marks which do not form letters, there are letters which do not form words, and there are words which do not form poems. Only when a poem is read or heard as a poem does its uniqueness—its character as a poem—stand out clearly.

As one might guess, it is my conviction that the case of the poem is closely analogous to the case of the person. Our everyday experience of human beings as persons seems to me to be the perspective which is metaphysically ultimate. In our everyday experience of ourselves and others as conscious agents, we discover what is truly unique about being a human person. This personalistic perspective seems most comprehensive to me as well. That persons should be embodied seems no more surprising than that poems should be embodied.

**a model for integration**

Therefore, for me the Perspectival/Limiter of Science option offers rich possibilities for integrating contemporary scientific perspectives with the traditional personalistic account. The main problem that may remain is the question a dualist may raise concerning life after death, prior to the resurrection of the body. If the person is in some sense identical with his body, is life after death but prior to the resurrection a real possibility?

To answer this question we must remember that from the Perspectival position, though a person is in some sense identical with his body, he is not merely a body. The person is primarily a conscious agent who performs certain functions. The Perspectivalist holds that this agent happens to be identical at present with a particular body, just as a poem may happen to have a particular embodiment. However it will be recalled that the same poem is capable of embodiment in different forms. Similarly, a human person can undergo bodily changes—plastic surgery, amputation—without ceasing to be the same person. Christians believe that persons whom God resurrects will have radically changed bodies and yet they will continue to be the persons who they are. But is it possible for the person to continue to exist after the death of the old body, prior to the resurrection?

Certainly no philosophical proof can be given that such survival "in-between" is a reality. Having given up traditional dualism, the Perspectivalist cannot put any stock in theories of the immortality of the soul. But it is possible he needs no such theories. After all, the Christian thinker believes that my current existence is due to God's creative activity. I do not exist from moment to moment because I possess a soul but because God wills my continued existence. If God wills my continued existence after my death, could he not maintain it in some form—material or nonmaterial? The question hinges on the conceivability of the thesis, because not even God can perform logical nonsense. (Of course what appears to be logical nonsense to me may not be to God.) So far as I can tell, the idea of survival after death is not logical nonsense. Thinkers of every time and culture have been able to envision the continuation of at least some of their personal functions after death. Does God in fact choose to maintain persons in existence after death? The Bible seems to teach that he does. What form does this existence take? Here the Bible gives no clear teaching. It teaches that at death the believer goes to be with the Lord, but no clear picture of the nature of this existence is given. Speculative answers on this point are possible, but such speculation is probably fruitless except insofar as it serves the purposes of showing the conceivability of survival after death. In any case, such speculation should not detract from the clear scriptural emphasis that the full person is a bodily person and that the destiny of the Christian is the resurrection of the body.

When developed in this way, this view might still be described by some as a form of dualism. For we are asserting that some of the functions and activities of a person could continue after the death of the body. And this is perhaps the major point which dualists wish to insist upon. However, this view differs from at least some traditional versions of dualism. For we are not asserting that these functions and activities are being carried on at present in a nonphysical entity called the soul or mind, but rather that some of the
functions presently being carried on by the body could be carried on independently of the body. In claiming that this is possible, some would argue that we are committed to dualism, because asserting the possible separate existence of the "soulish" functions is equivalent to admitting a distinction between soul and body.

There is support for this claim. Descartes himself at least at one point argues that the soul and body must be distinct because they can be conceived as distinct, and whatever can be conceived as distinct could exist separately, if God so willed it. That is, he seems to base his claim, not on the fact of the actual separation of soul and body, but on their possible separation. If dualism is defined in this way, then my view is indeed dualistic. But this sort of dualism does not seem to threaten the unity of the person. Nor does it seem to be a view which contemporary or future developments in brain physiology could undermine. For even the most hard-nosed reductionist materialists usually only argue that the identity of mind and body is a contingent identity. They admit, even stress, that it is logically possible that the mind could be a separate entity and claim only that it is a present fact that mind and brain are identical. Even in the face of this hard-nosed position, the Christian's position seems secure. The Christian could here simply assert that after death this logical possibility becomes a reality, without, of course, agreeing with the reductionist claim that consciousness is only a set of physical events. For whatever is logically possible is actually possible for God.

It seems to me therefore that the Perspectival/Limiter of Science position offers great promise as a working model for reconciling the contemporary sciences of man with biblical personalism. Such a view allows for a unified view of the person which is congenial to the Bible's emphasis on the unity of the person and the resurrection of the body. This does not mean, however, that I think the other models for integration have nothing to offer. In fact, I think the Humanizer of Science position is particularly helpful. Indeed I am convinced that the differences between the Humanizer and the Perspectivalist are not so great as they might appear and that there is hope that the two views might be synthesized, so long as both sides state their views moderately.

The main difference between them may in the last analysis be essentially semantic. It concerns the question, "What sort of intellectual enterprise deserves the essentially honorific title of 'science'?" No one familiar with the power of words and the prestige of science would want to call such a dispute "merely" one of semantics. But the following points should be noted. First, Humanizers, at least of a moderate variety, do not necessarily deny that there are more restricted methods of investigation which can legitimately and usefully tell us things about men. They merely wish to urge that the scientific picture produced by these methods is fragmented and incomplete and must be supplemented by richer and looser procedures to get a full picture of man. Of course they feel that these methods are equally deserving of the name "science."

Second, Perspectivalists do not necessarily have to deny that the dimensions or aspects of human reality which science, because of its limited perspective, fails to see can be cognitively investigated or reflected upon in some way. Once the bugaboo of scientism is dismissed, we do not have to be afraid to admit that there may be genuine knowledge which is not "scientific" (which does not mean unscientific). Perspectivalists are inclined to say that man can be reflected upon as a moral, religious and creative being. Concepts can be explored and beliefs formed in the arenas of theology, philosophy, literature and everyday life. While these arenas may not be judged sciences, they can nonetheless be penetrated by thought. We can in these matters be learned or ignorant, wise or foolish. We can form our opinions for good and bad reasons, and these can be discussed and examined in the critical marketplace of ideas.

The moderate Humanizer and the Perspectivalist, once they realize that their disagreement over the use of the term "science" is not substantive but merely reflects a sensitivity to different (but equally important) emphases, have much to say to each other. The Perspectival/Limiter of Science, with his concern for the integrity of science, can help the Humanizer see the value of rigorous, objective inquiry. The Perspectivalist who appreciates the contribution of the sciences which take an essentially mechanistic view of man helps us to see man's "creatureliness" more clearly. The Humanizer, on the other hand, with his sensitivity for the role which subjectivity and presuppositions play in science, can help the Per-
spectivalist gain a clearer understanding of his own subjective commitments, and a greater sensitivity to the way presuppositions may shape a particular scientific methodology. It is commonplace among thinkers of a Perspectival bent to say that B. F. Skinner’s scientific work is excellent but that in Skinner’s popular writings unwarranted extrapolations are made. Without in any way attempting to judge the merit of Skinner’s scientific work, I should like to say that this distinction is not easy to draw because the line between Skinner’s scientific work and his philosophy of man is more intimate than this comment would allow. The Humanizer of Science helps us to see the importance of underlying presuppositions.

The Christian thinker who is working from a synthesis of the Perspectival and Humanizer positions seems to be in a position to offer a view of the person which does the most justice to the following concepts: (1) the creatureliness of the person, (2) the transcendence of the person, (3) the unity of the person, and (4) the integrity of science.

First, as man is part of the created order, it is not surprising that methods of investigation which have proved fruitful in dealing with nonhuman animals or even nonliving entities such as computers should be fruitful in studying human beings as well. It is my earnest hope that no one has read this essay as an attack on behaviorism or any other scientific approach to human behavior, no matter how mechanistic. I am completely convinced that such scientific approaches offer great promise in dealing with many significant human problems. The more we understand the nonrational mechanisms which govern our own behavior, the more ability we gain to intervene rationally and gain more control (and freedom) over our own behavior. The person who is moody and depressed because of an inadequate diet is a slave to his emotions so long as he is ignorant of their true cause. With knowledge of the mechanisms involved, he gains some ability to control his emotions by changing his diet. Similar points could be made about the person with subconscious hang-ups, the person who is a rigid product of his socio-economic circumstances or the person who is manipulated by clever use of reinforcements. Only knowledge of these causal mechanisms offers promise of greater freedom. The creatureliness of man means that human freedom is sharply limited. Indeed, rather than speaking of “freedom” per se, in most cases it makes more sense for us to speak of the degree of freedom which an act reflects.

Second, the Christian thinker must remember that human beings are not only creatures but creatures made in the image of God. Hence man’s transcendence of the mechanical order of nature, though incomplete, must not be lost sight of. Human beings are, like God, conscious agents who make free choices. They are persons with all that this word implies, and all forms of reductionism must be eschewed.

Third, these creaturely persons are nevertheless unified. They are not simply a body plus a soul, where soul is taken to be an actual separate entity. As bodily creatures they are persons who bear the image of God. This unity seems best preserved by the sort of model we have sketched out.

Finally, this Perspectival view which has been reconciled to the Humanizer of Science view seems to do the best job of preserving the integrity of science. This model for integration not only respects the rigorous methods of the hard-nosed sciences; it also helps those sciences acquire a perspective on their own presuppositions and values.

Is such a model for integration a viable possibility? It seems to me to be not merely a possibility but a reality. That is, it seems implicit in a great deal of the recent work done by practicing Christian scholars in their respective scientific disciplines. What I have hoped to do in this essay is not to propose a new way of integrating Christian personalism with the human sciences but to help those engaged in carrying out this integration gain a greater self-consciousness about their approach, a greater understanding of the issues and their significance, and a clearer perception of what alternatives there may be. To accomplish these goals even in slight measure would be no mean feat.