do not carry away with us the Permanent Possibilities of Sensation: they remain until we return, or arise and cease under conditions with which our presence has in general nothing to do. And more than all—they are, and will be after we have ceased to feel, Permanent Possibilities of sensation to other beings than ourselves. Thus our actual sensations and the permanent possibilities of sensation, stand out in obtrusive contrast to one another: and when the idea of Cause has been acquired, and extended by generalisation from the parts of our experience to its aggregate whole, nothing can be more natural than that the Permanent Possibilities should be classed by us as existences generically distinct from our sensations, but of which our sensations are the effect.

The same theory which accounts for our ascribing to an aggregate of possibilities of sensation, a permanent existence which our sensations themselves do not possess, and consequently a greater reality than belongs to our sensations, also explains our attributing greater objectivity to the Primary Qualities of bodies than to the Secondary. For the sensations which correspond to what are called the Primary Qualities (as soon at least as we come to apprehend them by two senses, the eye as well as the touch) are always present when any part of the group is so. But colours, tastes, smells, and the like, being, in comparison, fugacious, are not, in the same degree, conceived as being always there, even when nobody is present to perceive them. The sensations answering to the Secondary Qualities are only occasional, those to the Primary, constant. The Secondary, moreover, vary with different persons, and with the temporary sensibility of our organs; the Primary, when perceived at all, are, as far as we know, the same to all persons and at all times.

LUDWIG FEUERBACH (1804-72) began his university career at Heidelberg, where he studied theology. Subsequently he moved to Berlin and, despite parental opposition, turned his attention to philosophy. He worked under Hegel for two years, submitting his dissertation in 1828 and at the same time becoming a Privatdozent at the University of Erlangen. He did not, however, continue his pursuit of an academic career. Instead he retired into private life, devoting himself first to producing studies in the history of philosophy and later to undertaking a radical reassessment of the Hegelian position. Feuerbach's most famous work in this connection was The Essence of Christianity (1841), from which the selections below are taken. It was followed by a number of other books, including Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Philosophy (1842), Fundamental Tenets of the Philosophy of the Future (1843), and The Essence of Religion (1845).

Feuerbach tends today to be remembered more as a seminal influence in the development of Marxism than as an important thinker in his own right. Yet, despite the rather turgid and repetitive quality of much of his writing, there is considerable penetration in his conception of Hegelian metaphysics as an "esoteric psychology" which contains the truth about the role of religion in human life and history in a hidden or misleading form. According to him, the Hegelian system was the "rational expression" of Christianity; the notion that spirit goes outside itself in nature and then returns to consciousness of itself in man represented the inner meaning of theological doctrine, however much it might seem to conflict with certain tenets of orthodoxy, such as those that treat God as an external personal being. Hegel had treated God and man as intrinsically connected; his error, on the other hand, was to regard God (or absolute spirit) as the true subject, man being relegated to the status of
The Essence of Religion Considered Generally*

Religion, at least the Christian, is the relation of man to himself, or more correctly to his own nature (i.e., his subjective nature); but a relation to it, viewed as a nature apart from his own. The divine thing is nothing else than the human being, or, rather, the human nature purified, freed from the limits of the individual man, made objective—i.e., contemplated and revered as another, a distinct being. All the attributes of the divine nature are, therefore, attributes of the human nature.

In relation to the attributes, the predicates, of the Divine Being, this is admitted without hesitation, but by no means in relation to the subject of these predicates. The negation of the subject is held to be irreligion, nay, atheism; though not so the negation of the predicates. But that which has no predicates or qualities, has no effect upon me; that which has no effect upon me has no existence for me. To deny all the qualities of a being is equivalent to denying the being himself. A being without qualities is one which cannot become an object to the mind, and such a being is virtually non-existent. Where man deprives God of all qualities, God is no longer anything more to him than a negative being. To the truly religious man, God is not a being without qualities, because to him he is a positive, real being. The theory that God cannot be defined, and consequently cannot be known by man, is therefore the offspring of recent times, a product of modern unbelief.

As reason is and can be pronounced finite only where man regards sensual enjoyment, or religious emotion, or aesthetic contemplation, or moral sentiment, as the absolute, the true; so the proposition that God is unknowable or undefinable, can only be enunciated and become fixed as a dogma, where this object has no longer any interest for the intellect; where the real, the positive, alone has any hold on man, where the real

no belief is sacred. They are all alienable, my alienable property, and are annihilated, as they are created, by me.

Self-enjoyment is embittered to me by my thinking. I must serve another, by my fancying myself under obligation to him, by my holding myself called to "self-sacrifice," "resignation," "enthusiasm." All right: if I no longer serve any idea, any "higher essence," then it is clear of itself that I no longer serve any man either, but—under all circumstances—myself. But thus I am not merely in fact or in being, but also for my consciousness, the—unique.

There pertains to you more than the divine, the human, etc.; yours pertains to you.

Look upon yourself as more powerful than they give you out for, and you have more power; look upon yourself as more, and you have more.

You are then not merely called to everything divine, entitled to everything human, but owner of what is yours, i.e. of all that you possess the force to make your own; i.e. you are appropriate and capacitated for everything that is yours.

People have always supposed that they must give me a destiny lying outside myself, so that at last they demanded that I should lay claim to the human because I am man. This is the Christian magic circle. Fichte's ego too is the same essence outside me, for every one is ego, and, if only this has rights, then it is "the ego," it is not I. But I am not an ego along with other egos, but the sole ego: I am unique. Hence my wants too are unique, and my deeds; in short, everything about me is unique. And it is only as this unique I that I take everything for my own, as I set myself to work, and develop myself, only as this. I do not develop man, nor as man, but, as I, I develop—myself.

Karl Marx (1818-83) was born in Trier, Germany, the son of a Jewish lawyer of mildly liberal views. In 1835 he attended the University of Bonn as a law student, subsequently transferring to Berlin. Here he abandoned law for philosophy, made a concentrated study of Hegel's thought, and became associated with the so-called "Young Hegelians"—a group of men who sought to interpret the Hegelian system in a more progressive manner than had previously been done. In 1842 Marx was in Cologne, where he edited the radical Rheinische Zeitung with a subversive venom which finally led to its suppression by the Prussian authorities in April of the following year. He decided to emigrate to Paris, where he remained until 1845. Marx's stay in the French capital was fruitful in a number of ways. It brought him into contact with leading socialists like Proudhon and Louis Blanc, as well as providing him with an opportunity to further his researches into the doctrines of such political economists as Adam Smith, Quesnay, Ricardo, and Say. Moreover, it was in Paris that he first met Friedrich Engels (1820-95) who, as the son of a wealthy cotton manufacturer, possessed a first-hand acquaintance with labor conditions in contemporary industrial society. This meeting marked the beginning of a lifetime of collaboration in revolutionary writing and activity, of which the most important immediate products were The German Ideology (completed, though not published, in 1846) and the Communist Manifesto (1848). In 1849, after the collapse of the revolutionary movements on the continent, Marx moved to London where he spent the rest of his life. The first volume of his Capital appeared in Hamburg in 1867, the succeeding two volumes being published posthumously in 1885 and 1894.

It is arguable that Marx's principal contributions to nineteenth-century thought belong to the field of social and economic analysis rather than to that
Critique of Hegel's Dialectic and General Philosophy*

...Hegel's Encyclopaedia begins with logic, with pure speculative thought, and ends with absolute knowledge, the self-conscious and self-conceiving philosophical or absolute mind, i.e., the superhuman abstract mind. The whole of the Encyclopaedia is nothing but the extended being of the philosophical mind, its self-objectification; and the philosophical mind is nothing but the alienated world-mind thinking within the bounds of its self-alienation, i.e. conceiving itself in an abstract manner. Logic is the money of the mind, the speculative thought-value of man and of nature, their essence indifferent to any real determinate-character and thus unreal; thought which is alienated and abstract and ignores real nature and man. The external character of this abstract thought...nature as it exists for this abstract thought. Nature is external to it, loss of itself, and is only conceived as something external, as abstract thought, but alienated abstract thought. Finally, spirit, this thought which returns to its own origin and which, as anthropological, phenomenological, psychological, customary, artistic-religious spirit, is not valid for itself until it discovers itself and relates itself to itself as absolute knowledge in the absolute (i.e. abstract) spirit, and so receives its conscious and fitting existence. For its real mode of existence is abstraction.

Hegel commits a double error. The first appears most clearly in the Phenomenology, the birthplace of his philosophy. When Hegel conceives wealth, the power of the state, etc. as entities alienated from the human being, he conceives them only in their thought form. They are entities of thought and thus simply an alienation of pure (i.e., abstract) philosophical thought. The whole movement, therefore, ends in absolute knowledge. It is precisely abstract thought from which these