The Transcendental Doctrine of Method
First Chapter
The discipline of pure reason

In humanity's general lust for knowledge, negative judgments, which
are negative not merely on the basis of logical form but also on the basis
of their content, do not stand in high regard: one regards them as jealous
enemies of our unremitting drive straining for the expansion of our
cognition, and it almost takes an apology to earn toleration for them
let alone favor and esteem.

To be sure, logically one can express negatively any propositions one
wants, but in regard to the content of our cognition in general, that
is, whether it is expanded or limited by a judgment, negative judgments
have the special job solely of preventing error. Hence even negative
propositions, which are to prevent a false cognition, are often quite true
yet empty where error is never possible, i.e., not appropriate for their
purpose, and for this reason are often ridiculous, like the proposition of
the scholastic orator that Alexander could not have conquered any lands
without an army.

But where the limits of our possible cognition are very narrow, where
the temptation to judge is great, where the illusion that presents itself
is very deceptive, and where the disadvantage of error is very serious,
there the negative in instruction, which serves merely to defend us
from errors, is more important than many a positive teaching by means
of which our cognition could be augmented. The compulsion through
which the constant propensity to stray from certain rules is limited and
finally eradicated is called discipline. It is different from culture,
which would merely produce a skill without first canceling out another
one that is already present. In the formation of a talent, therefore,
which already has by itself a tendency to expression, discipline will
make a negative contribution, but culture and doctrine a positive one.

* I am well aware that in the language of the schools the name of discipline is
customarily used as equivalent to that of instruction. But there are so many

* Unterweisung

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Everyone will readily grant that the temperament as well as the tal-
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erents that would allow a free and unlimited movement (such as imagina-
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tion and wit) require discipline in many respects. But that reason, which
is properly obliged to prescribe its discipline for all other endeavors,
should have need of one itself, may certainly seem strange, and in fact
reason has previously escaped such a humiliation only because, given
the pomp and the serious mien with which it appears, no one could eas-
ily come to suspect it of frivolously playing with fancies instead of con-
cepts and words instead of things.

No critique of reason in empirical use was needed, since its principles
were subjected to a continuous examination on the touchstone of ex-
perience; it was likewise unnecessary in mathematics, whose concepts
must immediately be exhibited in concreto in pure intuition, through
which anything unfounded and arbitrary instantly becomes obvious.
But where neither empirical nor pure intuition keeps reason in a visible
track, namely in its transcendental use in accordance with mere con-
cepts, there it so badly needs a discipline to constrain its propensity to
expansion beyond the narrow boundaries of possible experience and to
preserve it from straying and error that the entire philosophy of pure
reason is concerned merely with this negative use. Individual errors can
be remedied through censure and their causes through critique. But
where, as in pure reason, an entire system of delusions and deceptions
is encountered, which are connected with each other and unified under
common principles, there a quite special and indeed negative legisla-
tion seems to be required, which under the name of a discipline erects,
as it were, a system of caution and self-examination out of the nature of
reason and the objects of its pure use, before which no false sophistical
illusion can stand up but must rather immediately betray itself, regard-
less of all grounds for being spared.

But it is well to note that in this second main part of the transcen-
dental critique I do not direct the discipline of pure reason to the con-
tent but rather only to the method of cognition from pure reason. The
former has already taken place in the Doctrine of Elements. But there
is so much that is similar in the use of reason, whatever object it may be
other cases where the first expression, as correction, must carefully be con-
trasted to teaching; and the nature of things itself also makes it necessary to
preserve the only suitable expression for this difference, that I wish that this
word would never be allowed to be used in anything but the negative sense.

* Principien
* Zucht
* Beliefung
applied to, and yet, insofar as it would be transcendental, it is so essentially different from all other uses, that without the admonitory negative doctrine of a discipline especially aimed at them the errors could not be avoided that must necessarily arise from the inappropriate pursuit of such methods, which might be suitable for reason elsewhere but not here.

First Chapter
First Section

The discipline of pure reason in dogmatic use.

Mathematics gives the most resplendent example of pure reason happily expanding itself without assistance from experience. Examples are contagious, especially for the same faculty, which naturally flatters itself that it will have the same good fortune in other cases that it has had in one. Hence pure reason hopes to be able to expand itself in as happy and well grounded a way in its transcendental use as it succeeded in doing in its mathematical use, by applying the same method in the former case that was of such evident utility in the latter. It is therefore very important for us to know whether the method for obtaining apodictic certainty that one calls mathematical in the latter science is identical with that by means of which one seeks the same certainty in philosophy, and that would have to be called dogmatic.

Philosophical cognition is rational cognition from concepts, mathematical cognition that from the construction of concepts. But to construct a concept means to exhibit a priori the intuition corresponding to it. For the construction of a concept, therefore, a non-empirical intuition is required, which consequently, as intuition, is an individual object, but that must nevertheless, as the construction of a concept (of a general representation), express in the representation universal validity for all possible intuitions that belong under the same concept. Thus I construct a triangle by exhibiting an object corresponding to this concept, either through mere imagination, in pure intuition, or on paper, in empirical intuition, but in both cases completely a priori, without having had to borrow the pattern for it from any experience. The individual drawn figure is empirical, and nevertheless serves to express the concept without damage to its universality, for in the case of this empirical intuition we have taken account only of the action of constructing the concept, to which many determinations, e.g., those of the magnitude of the sides and the angles, are entirely indifferent, and thus we have abstracted from these differences, which do not alter the concept of the triangle.

Philosophical cognition thus considers the particular only in the universal, but mathematical cognition considers the universal in the particular, indeed even in the individual, yet nonetheless a priori and by means of reason, so that just as this individual is determined under certain general conditions of construction, the object of the concept, to which this individual corresponds only as its schema, must likewise be thought as universally determined.

The essential difference between these two kinds of rational cognition therefore consists in this form, and does not rest on the difference in their matter, or objects. Those who thought to distinguish philosophy from mathematics by saying of the former that it has merely quality while the latter has quantity as its object have taken the effect for the cause. The form of mathematical cognition is the cause of its pertaining solely to quanta. For only the concept of magnitudes can be constructed, i.e., exhibited a priori in intuition, while qualities cannot be exhibited in anything but empirical intuition. Hence a rational cognition of them can be possible only through concepts. Thus no one can ever derive an intuition corresponding to the concept of reality from anywhere except experience, and can never partake of it a priori from oneself and prior to empirical consciousness. The shape of a cone can be made intuitive without any empirical assistance, merely in accordance with the concept, but the color of this cone must first be given in one experience or another. I cannot exhibit the concept of a cause in general in intuition in any way except in an example given to me by experience, etc. Now philosophy as well as mathematics does deal with magnitudes, e.g., with totality, infinity, etc. And mathematics also occupies itself with the difference between lines and planes as spaces with different quality, and with the continuity of extension as a quality of it. But although in such cases they have a common object, the manner of dealing with it through reason is entirely different in philosophical than in mathematical consideration. The former confines itself solely to general concepts, the latter cannot do anything with the mere concepts but hurries immediately to intuition, in which it considers the concept in concreto, although not empirically, but rather solely as one which it has exhibited a priori, i.e., constructed, and in which that which follows from the general conditions of the construction must also hold generally of the object of the constructed concept.

Give a philosopher the concept of a triangle, and let him try to find out in his way how the sum of its angles might be related to a right angle. He has nothing but the concept of a figure enclosed by three straight lines, and in it the concept of equally many angles. Now he may

* Object

* Objecte
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in my concept of a triangle (this is nothing further than its mere definition), rather I am to go beyond it to properties that do not lie in this concept but still belong to it. Now this is not possible in any way but by determining my object in accordance with the conditions of the other empirical or pure intuition. The former would yield only an empirical proposition (through measurement of its angles), which would contain no universality, let alone necessity, and propositions of this sort are not under discussion here. The second procedure, however, is that of mathematical and here indeed of geometrical construction, by means of which I put together in a pure intuition, just as in an empirical one, the manifold that belongs to the schema of a triangle in general and thus to its concept, through which general synthetic propositions must be constructed.

In vain, therefore, would I reflect on the triangle philosophically, i.e., discursively, without thereby getting any further than the mere definition with which, however, I had to begin. There is, to be sure, a transcendental synthesis from concepts alone, with which in turn only the philosopher can succeed, but which never concerns more than a thing in general, with regard to the conditions under which its perception could belong to possible experience. But in mathematical problems the question is not about this nor about existence as such at all, but about the properties of the objects in themselves, solely insofar as these are combined with the concept of them.

In these examples we have only attempted to make distinct what a great difference there is between the discursive use of reason in accordance with concepts and its intuitive use through the construction of concepts. Now the question naturally arises, what is the cause that makes such a twofold use of reason necessary, and by means of which conditions can one know whether only the first or also the second takes place?

All of our cognition is in the end related to possible intuitions: for through these alone is an object given. Now an a priori concept (a non-empirical concept) either already contains a pure intuition in itself, in which case it can be constructed; or else it contains nothing but the synthesis of possible intuitions, which are not given a priori, in which case one can well judge synthetically and a priori by its means, but only discursively, in accordance with concepts, and never intuitively through the construction of the concept.

Now of all intuition none is given a priori except the mere form of ap-

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\[\text{Footnote 1:}\] The word \textit{construieren} is missing in the first edition.

\[\text{Footnote 2:}\] Existenz.

\[\text{Footnote 3:}\] derkennen.

\[\text{Footnote 4:}\] and the second edition replaces \textit{aller} in the first.
pearances, space and time, and a concept of these, as quanta, can be exhibited a priori in pure intuition, i.e., constructed, together with either its quality (its shape) or else merely its quantity (the mere synthesis of the homogeneous manifold) through number. The matter of appearances, however, through which things in space and time are given to us, can be represented only in perception, thus a posteriori. The only concept that represents this empirical content of appearances a priori is the concept of the thing in general, and the synthetic a priori cognition of this can never yield a priori more than the mere rule of the synthesis of that which perception may give a posteriori, but never the intuition of the real object, since this must necessarily be empirical.

Synthetic propositions that pertain to things in general, the intuition of which cannot be given a priori, are transcendental. Thus transcendental propositions can never be given through construction of concepts, but only in accordance with a priori concepts. They contain merely the rule in accordance with which a certain synthetic unity of that which cannot be intuitively represented a priori (of perceptions) should be sought empirically. They cannot, however, exhibit a single one of their concepts a priori in any case, but do this only a posteriori, by means of experience, which first becomes possible in accordance with those synthetic principles.

If one is to judge synthetically about a concept, then one must go beyond this concept, and indeed go to the intuition in which it is given. For if one were to remain with that which is contained in the concept, then the judgment would be merely analytic, an explanation of what is actually contained in the thought. However, I can go from the concept to the pure or empirical intuition corresponding to it in order to assess it in concreto and cognize a priori or a posteriori what pertains to its object. The former is rational and mathematical cognition through the construction of the concept, the latter merely empirical (mechanical) cognition, which can never yield necessary and apodictic propositions. Thus I could analyze my empirical concept of gold without thereby gaining anything more than being able to enumerate what I actually think by means of this word, which would certainly produce a logical improvement in my cognition, but no augmentation or supplementation of it. But I can take the matter that goes by this name and initiate perceptions of it, which will provide me with various synthetic though empirical propositions. The mathematical concept of a triangle I would construct, i.e., give in intuition a priori, and in this way I would acquire synthetic but rational cognition. However, if I am given the transcendental concept of a reality, substance, force, etc., it designates neither an empirical nor a pure intuition, but only the synthesis of empirical intuitions (which thus cannot be given a priori), and since the synthesis cannot proceed a priori to the intuition that corresponds to it, no determining synthetic proposition.

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but only a principle of the synthesis of possible empirical intuitions can arise from it. A transcendental proposition is therefore a synthetic rational cognition in accordance with mere concepts, and thus discursive, since through it all synthetic unity of empirical cognition first becomes possible, but no intuition is given by it a priori.

There are thus two uses of reason, which, regardless of the universality of cognition and its a priori generation, which they have in common, are nevertheless very different in procedure, precisely because there are two components to the appearance through which all objects are given to us: the form of intuition (space and time), which can be cognized and determined completely a priori, and the matter (the physical), or the content, which signifies a something that is encountered in space and time, and which thus contains an existence and corresponds to sensation. With regard to the latter, which can never be given in a determinate manner except empirically, we can have nothing a priori except indeterminate concepts of the synthesis of possible sensations insolar as they belong to the unity of apperception (in a possible experience). With regard to the former we can determine our concepts a priori, for we create the objects themselves in space and time through homogeneous synthesis, considering them merely as quanta. The former is called the use of reason in accordance with concepts, because we can do nothing further than bring appearances under concepts, according to their real content, which cannot be determined except empirically, i.e., a posteriori (though in accord with those concepts as rules of an empirical synthesis); the latter is the use of reason through construction of concepts, because these concepts, since they already apply to an a priori intuition, for that very reason can be determinately given in pure intuition a priori and without any empirical data. To decide about everything that exists (a thing in space or time) whether and how far it is or is not a quantum, whether existence or the lack thereof must be represented in it, how far this something (which fills space or time) is a primary substratum or mere determination, whether it has a relation of its existence to something else as cause or effect, and

By means of the concept of cause I actually go beyond the empirical concept of an occurrence (that something happens), but not to the intuition that exhibits the concept of cause in concreto, rather to the time-conditions in general that may be found to be in accord with the concept of cause in experience. I therefore proceed merely in accordance with concepts, and cannot proceed through construction of concepts, since the concept is a rule of the synthesis of perceptions, which are not pure intuitions and which therefore cannot be given a priori.

* gleichförmige
finally whether with regard to its existence it is isolated or in reciprocal dependence with others; to decide about the possibility, actuality, and necessity of its existence or the opposites thereof: all of this belongs to **rational cognition** from concepts, which is called **philosophical**. But to determine an intuition *a priori* in space (shape), to divide time (duration), or merely to cognize the universal in the synthesis of one and the same thing in time and space and the magnitude of an intuition in general (number) which arises from that: that is a **concern of reason** through construction of the concepts, and is called **mathematical**.

The great good fortune that reason enjoys by means of mathematics leads entirely naturally to the expectation that, if not mathematics itself, then at least its method will also succeed outside of the field of magnitudes, since it brings all of its concepts to intuitions that it can give *a priori* and by means of which, so to speak, it becomes master over nature; while pure philosophy, on the contrary, fumbles around in nature with discursive *a priori* concepts without being able to make their reality intuitive *a priori* and by that means confirm it. Further, the masters of this art do not seem to lack any confidence in themselves, nor does the public seem to lack any great expectations of their talents, should they ever concern themselves about this at all. For since they have hardly ever philosophized about mathematics (a difficult business!), they have never given a thought to the specific difference between the two uses of reason. Rules used customarily and empirically, which they have borrowed from common reason, count as axioms with them. From whence the concepts of space and time with which they busy themselves (as the only original *quantum*) might be derived, they have never concerned themselves, and likewise it seems to them to be useless to investigate the origin of pure concepts of the understanding and the scope of their validity; rather, they merely use them. In all of this they proceed quite correctly, as long as they do not overstep their appointed boundaries, namely those of nature. But they slip unnoticed from the field of sensibility to the insecure territory of pure and even transcendental concepts, where they are allowed the ground neither to stand nor to swim (*instabilis tellus, immobius unda*), and can make only perfunctory steps of which time does not preserve the least trace, while on the contrary their progress in mathematics is a high road on which even their most remote descendants can still stride with confidence.

* "Earth that cannot be stood upon, water that cannot be swam in" (Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, I,16). The line comes from Ovid's opening image of chaos, in which there are no fixed boundaries: "If there was land and sea, there was no discernible shoreline, no way to walk on the one, or swim or sail in the other. In the gloom and mark, vague shapes appeared for a moment, loomed, and then gave way, unsaying themselves and the world as well." (The *Metamorphoses of Ovid*, tr. David R. Slavitt [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1994], p. 1)

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The discipline of pure reason in dogmatic use

Since we have made it our duty to determine the bounds of pure reason in transcendental use exactly and with certainty, but this sort of endeavor has the peculiarity that, in spite of the most pressing and clearest warnings, it still always lets itself hope that it can stave off having to give up entirely the effort to get beyond the bounds of experience into the charming regions of the intellectual, it is therefore necessary to cut away, as it were, the last anchor of a fantastical hope, and to show that the pursuit of the mathematical method in this sort of cognition cannot offer the least advantage, unless it is that of revealing its own nakedness all the more distinctly, and revealing that mathematics and philosophy are two entirely different things, although they offer each other their hand in natural science, thus that the procedure of the one can never be imitated by that of the other.

Mathematics is thoroughly grounded on definitions, axioms, and demonstrations. I will content myself with showing that none of these elements, in the sense in which the mathematician takes them, can be achieved or imitated by philosophy, and that by means of his method the mathematician can build nothing in philosophy except houses of cards, while by means of his method the philosopher can produce nothing in mathematics but idle chatter, while philosophy consists precisely in knowing its bounds, and even the mathematician, if his talent is not already bounded by nature and limited to his specialty, can neither reject its warnings nor disregard them.

1. **On definitions.** As the expression itself reveals, to define properly means just to exhibit originally the exhaustive concept of a thing within its boundaries. Given such a requirement, an **empirical** concept cannot be defined at all but only **explicated**. For since we have in it only some marks of a certain kind of objects of the senses, it is never certain whether by means of the word that designates the same object

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* Exhaustiveness signifies the clarity and sufficiency of marks; **boundaries**, the precision, that is, that there are no more of these than are required for the exhaustive concept; **original**, however, that this boundary-determination is not derived from anywhere else and thus in need of a proof, which would make the supposed definition incapable of standing at the head of all judgments about an object.

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* Meßkennz.
* *Definitionen*. In this passage Kant prefers the Latinate *Definitionen* because it is, as he will argue, more precise in meaning than the German *Erklärung*. Throughout this paragraph "definition" will translate *Definitionen* and "define," *Definitionen*, unless otherwise noted.

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* Erklärung
The discipline of pure reason in dogmatic use

the concept, since through the explanation" of the concept the object is originally given, i.e., without the explanation being derived from anywhere else. The German language has for the expressions 

exposition, explication, declaration and definition" nothing more than the one word "explanation," and hence we must somewhat weaken the stringency of the requirement by which we denied philosophical explications the honorary title of "definition," and limit this entire remark to this, that philosophical definitions come about only as explications of given concepts, but mathematical ones as constructions of concepts that are originally made, thus the former come about only analytically through analysis (the completeness of which is never apodictically certain), while the latter come about synthetically, and therefore make the concept itself, while the former only explain it. From this it follows:

a) That in philosophy one must not imitate mathematics in putting the definitions first, unless perhaps as a mere experiment. For since they are analyses of given concepts, these concepts, though perhaps only still confused, come first, and the incomplete exposition precedes the complete one, so that we can often infer much from some marks that we have drawn from an as yet uncompleted analysis before we have arrived at a complete exposition, i.e., at a definition; in a word, it follows that in philosophy the definition, as distinctness made precise, must conclude rather than begin the work. On the contrary, in mathematics we do not have any concept at all prior to the definitions, as that through which the concept is first given; it therefore must and also always can begin with them.

b) Mathematical definitions can never err. For since the concept is first given through the definition, it contains just that which the definit

Philosophy is swarming with mistaken definitions, especially those that actually contain elements for definition but are not yet complete. If one would not know what to do with a concept until one had defined it, then all philosophizing would be in a bad way. But since, however far the elements (of the analysis) reach, a good and secure use can always be made of them, even imperfect definitions, i.e., propositions that are not really definitions but are true and thus approximations to them, can be used with great advantage. In mathematics definitions belong ad esse, in philosophy ad melius esse. Attaining them is fine, but often very difficult. Jurists are still searching for a definition of their concept of right.

Exposition
Erklärung
Exposition, Erklärung, Declaration and Definition.
All Latinate words: "Exposition, Erklärung, Declaration and Definition."
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transcendental philosophy. Philosophy thus has no axioms and can never simply offer its a priori principles as such, but must content itself with justifying their authority through a thorough deduction.

3. On demonstrations. Only an apodictic proof, insofar as it is intuitive, can be called a demonstration. Experience may well teach us what is, but not that it could not be otherwise. Hence empirical grounds of proof cannot yield apodictic proof. From a priori concepts (in discursive cognition), however, intuitive certainty, i.e., self-evidence, can never arise, however apodictically certain the judgment may otherwise be. Thus only mathematics contains demonstrations, since it does not derive its cognition from concepts, but from their construction, i.e., from the intuition that can be given a priori corresponding to the concepts. Even the way algebraists proceed with their equations, from which by means of reduction they bring forth the truth together with the proof, is not a geometrical construction, but it is still a characteristic construction, in which one displays by signs in intuition the concepts, especially of relations of quantities, and, without even regarding the heuristic, secures all inferences against mistakes by placing each of them before one's eyes. Philosophical cognition, on the contrary, must do without this advantage, since it must always consider the universal in abstracto (through concepts), while mathematics can assess the universal in concreto (in the individual intuition) and yet through pure a priori intuition, where every false step becomes visible. Since they can only be conducted by means of mere words (the object in thought), I would therefore prefer to call the former acrooamatic (discursive) proofs rather than demonstrations, which, as the expression already indicates, proceed through the intuition of the object.

Now from all of this it follows that it is not suited to the nature of philosophy, especially in the field of pure reason, to strut about with a dogmatic gait and to decorate itself with the tides and ribbons of mathematics, to whose ranks philosophy does not belong, although it has every cause to hope for a sisterly union with it. These are idle pretensions that can never succeed, but that instead countermand its aim of revealing the deceptions of a reason that misjudges its own boundaries and of bringing the self-conceit of speculation back to modest but thorough self-knowledge by means of a sufficient illumination of our concepts. In its transcendental efforts, therefore, reason cannot look ahead so confidently, as if the path on which it has traveled leads quite directly to the goal, and it must not count so boldly on the premises

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* Demonstrations
* Evidences
* Verbalities
* Selbstkenntnis

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Principium
that ground it as if it were unnecessary for it frequently to look back and consider whether there might not be errors in the progress of its inferences to be discovered that were overlooked in its principles and that make it necessary either to determine them further or else to alter them entirely.

I divide all apodictic propositions (whether they are demonstrable or immediately certain) into dogmata and mathemata. A direct synthetic proposition from concepts is a dogma; such a proposition through construction of concepts, on the contrary, is a mathema. Analytic judgments do not really teach us anything more about the object than what the concept that we have of it already contains in itself, since they do not expand cognition beyond the concept of the subject, but only elucidate this concept. They cannot therefore properly be called dogmas (a word which one could perhaps translate as theorems). But in accordance with ordinary usage, of the two types of synthetic a priori propositions only those belonging to philosophical cognition carry this name, and one would hardly call the propositions of arithmetic or geometry “dogmata.” This usage thus confirms the explanation we have given that only judgments from concepts, and not those from the construction of concepts, can be called dogmatic.

Now all of pure reason in its merely speculative use contains not a single direct synthetic judgment from concepts. For through ideas, as we have shown, it is not capable of any synthetic judgments that would have objective validity; through concepts of the understanding, however, it certainly erects secure principles, but not directly from concepts, but rather always only indirectly through the relation of these concepts to something entirely contingent, namely possible experience; since if this (something as object of possible experience) is presupposed, then they are of course apodictically certain, but in themselves they cannot even be cognized a priori (directly) at all. Thus no one can have fundamental insight into the proposition “Everything that happens has its cause” from these given concepts alone. Hence it is not a dogma, although from another point of view, namely that of the sole field of its possible use, i.e., experience, it can very well be proved apodictically. But although it must be proved, it is called a principle and not a theorem because it has the special property that it first makes possible its ground of proof, namely experience, and must always be presupposed in this.

Now if in the content of the speculative use of pure reason there are no dogmata at all, then any dogmatic method, whether it is borrowed from the mathematicians or is of some special kind, is inappropriate per se. For it merely masks mistakes and errors, and deceives philosophy, the proper aim of which is to allow all of the steps of reason to be seen in the clearest light. Nevertheless, the method can always be systematic. For our reason itself (subjectively) is a system, but in its pure use, by means of mere concepts, only a system for research in accordance with principles of unity, for which experience alone can give the matter. Of the special method of a transcendental philosophy, however, nothing can here be said, since we are concerned only with a critique of the circumstances of our faculty—whether we can build at all, and how high we can carry our building with the materials that we have (the pure \( a \) priori concepts).

First Chapter
Second Section
The discipline of pure reason with regard to its apodictic use.

Reason must subject itself to critique in all its undertakings, and cannot restrict the freedom of critique through any prohibition without damaging itself and drawing upon itself a disadvantageous suspicion. Now there is nothing so important because of its utility, nothing so holy, that it may be exempted from this searching review and inspection, which knows no respect for persons. The very existence of reason depends upon this freedom, which has no dictatorial authority, but whose claim is never anything more than the agreement of free citizens, each of whom must be able to express his reservations, indeed even his veto, without holding back.

But now although reason can never refuse critique, it does not always have cause to shrink from it. Pure reason in its dogmatic (not mathematical) use is not, however, so conscious of the most exact observation of its supreme laws that it can appear before the critical eye of a higher and judicial reason except with modesty, indeed with a complete renunciation of all pretensions to dogmatic authority.

But it is quite different if it does not have to deal with the censure of a judge, but with the claims of its fellow citizens, against which it has merely to defend itself. For since the latter would be just as dogmatic, though in denial, as reason would be in its affirmation, there can be a justification \( x\kappa \varepsilon \theta \varphi \varphi \tau \sigma \nu \) which secures it against all interference and provides it with a title to its possession that need shrink from no