The Transcendental Doctrine of Elements
First Part
The Transcendental Aesthetic

In whatever way and through whatever means a cognition may relate to objects, that through which it relates immediately to them, and at which all thought as a means is directed as an end, is intuition. This, however, takes place only insofar as the object is given to us; but this in turn, (at least for us humans,) is possible only if it affects the mind in a certain way. The capacity (receptivity) to acquire representations through the way in which we are affected by objects is called sensibility. Objects are therefore given to us by means of sensibility, and it alone affords us intuitions; but they are thought through the understanding, and from it arise concepts. But all thought, whether straightforward (direct) or through a detour (indirect), must, by means of certain marks, ultimately be related to intuitions, thus, in our case, to sensibility, since there is no other way in which objects can be given to us.

The effect of an object on the capacity for representation, insofar as we are affected by it, is sensation. That intuition which is related to the object through sensation is called empirical. The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called appearance.

I call that in the appearance which corresponds to sensation its matter, but that which allows the manifold of appearance to be ordered in certain relations' I call the form of appearance. Since that within which the sensations can alone be ordered and placed in a certain form cannot itself be in turn sensation, the matter of all appearance is only given to us a posteriori, but its form must all lie ready for it in the mind a priori, and can therefore be considered separately from all sensation.

I call all representations pure (in the transcendental sense) in which nothing is to be encountered that belongs to sensation. Accordingly the pure form of sensible intuitions in general is to be encountered in the mind a priori, wherein all of the manifold of appearances is intuited in certain relations. This pure form of sensibility itself is also called pure intuition. So if I separate from the representation of a body that which the understanding thinks about it, such as substance, force, divisibility, etc., as well as that which belongs to sensation, such as impenetrability, hardness, color, etc., something from this empirical intuition is still left for me, namely extension and form. These belong to the pure intuition, which occurs a priori, even without an actual object of the senses or sensation, as a mere form of sensibility in the mind.

I call a science of all principles of a priori sensibility the transcendental aesthetic." There must therefore be such a science, which constitutes the first part of the transcendental doctrine of elements, in opposition to that which contains the principles of pure thinking, and which is named transcendental logic.

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4 We here present the revised version of the "Transcendental Aesthetic" that Kant prepared for the second edition of the Critique. Since in addition to the major changes that he made, all of which will be noted, Kant also made numerous minor changes that it would be cumbersome to note individually, we will enclose all the changes Kant made in B within angled brackets (<>), whether or not they are otherwise noted. Editorial notes on passages unchanged from A will not be repeated.

5 In the second edition, Kant divided the "Transcendental Doctrine of Elements" from the beginning of the "Transcendental Aesthetic" through the end of the "Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding" into twenty-seven numbered sections. In the case of some sections, new titles were also added for material otherwise taken over without other change from the first edition.

6 In the first edition this reads "intuited as ordered in certain relations . . ."
In the transcendental aesthetic we will therefore first isolate sensibility by separating off everything that the understanding thinks through its concepts, so that nothing but empirical intuition remains. Second, we will then detach from the latter everything that belongs to sensation, so that nothing remains except pure intuition and the mere form of appearances, which is the only thing that sensibility can make available a priori. In this investigation it will be found that there are two pure forms of sensible intuition as principles of a priori cognition, namely space and time, with the assessment of which we will now be concerned.

The Transcendental Aesthetic
First Section
On space.
§ 2
Metaphysical exposition of this concept.

By means of outer sense (a property of our mind) we represent to ourselves objects as outside us, and all as in space. In space their shape, magnitude, and relation to one another is determined, or determinable. Inner sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself, or its inner state, gives, to be sure, no intuition of the soul itself, as an object; yet it is still a determinate form, under which the intuition of its inner state is alone possible, so that everything that belongs to the inner determinations is represented in relations of time. Time can no more be intuited externally than space can be intuited as something in us. Now what are space and time? Are they actual entities? Are they only determinations or relations of things, yet ones that would pertain to them even if they were not intuited, or are they relations that only attach to the form of intuition alone, and thus to the subjective constitution of our mind, without which these predicates could not be ascribed to anything at all? In order to instruct ourselves about this, we will expound the concept of space first. I understand by exposition (expositio) the distinct (even if not complete) representation of that which belongs to a concept; but the exposition is metaphysical when it contains that which exhibits the concept as given a priori.

1) Space is not an empirical concept that has been drawn from outer experiences. For in order for certain sensations to be related to something outside me (i.e., to something in another place in space from that in which I find myself), thus in order for me to represent them as outside one another, thus not merely as different but as in different places, the representation of space must already be their ground. Thus the representation of space cannot be obtained from the relations of outer appearance through experience, but this outer experience is itself first possible only through this representation.

2) Space is a necessary representation, a priori, that is the ground of all outer intuitions. One can never represent that there is no space, though one can very well think that there are no objects to be encountered in it. It is therefore to be regarded as the condition of the possibility of appearances, not as a determination dependent on them, and is an a priori representation that necessarily grounds outer appearances. Space is not a discursive or, as is said, general concept of relations of things in general, but a pure intuition. For, first, one can only represent a single space, and if one speaks of many spaces, one understands by that only parts of one and the same unique space. And these parts cannot as it were precede the single all-encompassing space as its components (from which its composition would be possible), but rather are only thought in it. It is essentially single; the manifold in it, thus also the general concept of spaces in general, rests merely on limitations. From this it follows that in respect to it an a priori intuition (which is not empirical) grounds all concepts of it. Thus also all geometrical principles, e.g., that in a triangle two sides together are always greater than the third, are never derived from general concepts of line and triangle, but rather are derived from intuition and indeed derived a priori with apodictic certainty.

4) Space is represented as an infinite given magnitude. Now one must, to be sure, think of every concept as a representation that is contained in an infinite set of different possible representations (as their common mark), which thus contains these under itself; but no concept, as such, can be thought as if it contained an infinite set of representations within itself. Nevertheless space is so thought (for all the parts of space, even to infinity, are simultaneous). Therefore the original representation of space is an a priori intuition, not a concept.
Transcendental exposition of the concept of space.

I understand by a transcendental exposition the explanation of a concept as a principle from which insight into the possibility of other synthetic a priori cognitions can be gained. For this aim it is required 1) that such cognitions actually flow from the given concept, and 2) that these cognitions are only possible under the presupposition of a given way of explaining this concept.

Geometry is a science that determines the properties of space synthetically and yet a priori. What then must the representation of space be for such a cognition of it to be possible? It must originally be intuition; for from a mere concept no propositions can be drawn that go beyond the concept, which, however, happens in geometry (Introduction V). But this intuition must be encountered in us a priori, i.e., prior to all perception of a object, thus it must be pure, not empirical intuition. For geometrical propositions are all apodictic, i.e., combined with consciousness of their necessity, e.g., space has only three dimensions; but such propositions cannot be empirical or judgments of experience, nor inferred from them (Introduction II).

Now how can an outer intuition inhabit the mind that precedes the objects themselves, and in which the concept of the latter can be determined a priori? Obviously not otherwise than insofar as it has its seat merely in the subject, as its formal constitution for being affected by objects and thereby acquiring immediate representation, i.e., intuition, of them, thus only as the form of outer sense in general.

Thus our explanation alone makes the possibility of geometry as a synthetic a priori cognition comprehensible. Any kind of explanation that does not accomplish this, even if it appears to have some similarity with it, can most surely be distinguished from it by means of this characteristic.

Conclusions from the above concepts.

a) Space represents no property at all of any things in themselves nor any relation of them to each other, i.e., no determination of them that attaches to objects themselves and that would remain even if one were to abstract from all subjective conditions of intuition. For neither absolute nor relative determinations can be intuited prior to the existence of the things to which they pertain, thus be intuited a priori.

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* Principis
* Objecen
* Objecen
Doctrine of Elements. Part I. The Transcendental Aesthetic <B>
related<sup>a</sup> to something external that could be called a priori objective.<sup>b</sup>
For one cannot derive synthetic a priori propositions from any such representation, as one can from intuition in space (§ 3). Strictly speaking, therefore, ideality does not pertain to them, although they coincide with the representation of space in belonging only to the subjective constitution of the kind of sense, e.g., of sight, hearing, and feeling, through the sensations of colors, sounds, and warmth, which, however, since they are merely sensations and not intuitions, do not in themselves allow any object<sup>c</sup> to be cognized, least of all a priori.>

The aim of this remark is only to prevent one from thinking of illustrating the asserted ideality of space with completely inadequate examples, since things like colors, taste, etc., are correctly considered not as qualities of things but as mere alterations of our subject, which can even be different in different people. For in this case that which is originally itself only appearance, e.g., a rose, counts in an empirical sense as a thing in itself, which yet can appear different to every eye in regard to color. The transcendental concept of appearances in space, on the contrary, is a critical reminder that absolutely nothing that is intuited in space is a thing in itself, and that space is not a form that is proper to anything in itself, but rather that objects in themselves are not known to us at all, and that what we call outer objects are nothing other than mere representations of our sensibility, whose form is space, but whose true correlate, i.e., the thing in itself, is not and cannot be cognized through them, but is also never asked after in experience.

The Transcendental Aesthetic
Second Section
On time.

§ 4.
Metaphysical exposition of the concept of time.

Time is not an empirical concept that is somehow drawn from an experience. For simultaneity or succession would not themselves come into perception if the representation of time did not ground them a priori. Only under its presupposition can one represent that several things exist at one and the same time (simultaneously) or in different times (successively).

2) Time is a necessary representation that grounds all intuitions. In regard to appearances in general one cannot remove time, though one can very well take the appearances away from time. Time is therefore given a priori. In it alone is all actuality of appearances possible. The latter could all disappear, but time itself (as the universal condition of their possibility)<sup>d</sup> cannot be removed.

3) This a priori necessity also grounds the possibility of apodictic principles of relations of time, or axioms of time in general. It has only one dimension: different times are not simultaneous, but successive (just as different spaces are not successive, but simultaneous). These principles could not be drawn from experience, for this would yield neither strict universality nor apodictic certainty. We would only be able to say: This is what common perception teaches, but not: This is how matters must stand. These principles are valid as rules under which alone experiences are possible at all, and instruct us prior to them, not through it.<sup>e</sup>

4) Time is no discursive or, as one calls it, general concept, but a pure form of sensible intuition. Different times are only parts of one and the same time. That representation, however, which can only be given through a single object, is an intuition. Further, the proposition that different times cannot be simultaneous cannot be derived from a general concept. The proposition is synthetic, and cannot arise from concepts alone. It is therefore immediately contained in the intuition and representation of time.

5) The infinitude of time signifies nothing more than that every determinate magnitude of time is only possible through limitations of a single time grounding it. The original representation time must therefore be given as unlimited. But where the parts themselves and every magnitude of an object can be determinately represented only through limitation, there the entire representation cannot be given through concepts, (for they contain only partial representations),<sup>f</sup> but immediate intuition must ground them.<sup>g</sup>

§ 5
Transcendental exposition of the concept of time.

I can appeal to No. 3 where, in order to be brief, I have placed that which is properly transcendental under the heading of the metaphysical exposition. Here I add further that the concept of alteration and, with

<sup>a</sup> bezogene

<sup>b</sup> In the first edition, the remainder of this paragraph reads differently; see A28-9 above.

<sup>c</sup> Object

<sup>d</sup> These parentheses added in B.

<sup>e</sup> The text reads "betrachtet uns vor den selben, und nicht durch dieselben." Earlier editors suggested emending the last word to "dieselben"; but if the sentence is interpreted to mean "instructs us prior to experiences, not through common perception," it can be read without emendation.

<sup>f</sup> In the first edition: "for there the partial representations precede."

<sup>g</sup> B has "ihren" instead of "ihre" here.
Doctrine of Elements. Part I. The Transcendental Aesthetic

it, the concept of motion (as alteration of place), is only possible through and in the representation of time—that if this representation were not a priori (inner) intuition, then no concept, whatever it might be, could make comprehensible the possibility of an alteration, i.e., of a combination of contradictorily opposed predicates (e.g., a thing's being in a place and the not-being of the very same thing in the same place in one and the same object). Only in time can both contradictorily opposed determinations in one thing be encountered, namely successively. Our concept of time therefore explains the possibility of as much synthetic a priori cognition as is presented by the general theory of motion, which is no less fruitful.\(^3\)

Conclusions from these concepts.

1) Time is not something that would subsist for itself or attach to things as an objective determination, and thus remain if one abstracted from all subjective conditions of the intuition of them; for in the first case it would be something that was actual yet without an actual object. As far as the second case is concerned, however, time could not precede the objects as a determination or order attaching to the things themselves as their condition and be cognized and intuited a priori through synthetic propositions. But the latter, on the contrary, can very well occur if time is nothing other than the subjective condition under which all intuitions can take place in us. For then this form of inner intuition can be represented prior to the objects, thus a priori.

b) Time is nothing other than the form of inner sense, i.e., of the intuition of our self and our inner state. For time cannot be a determination of outer appearances; it belongs neither to a shape or a position, etc., but on the contrary determines the relation of representations in our inner state. And just because this inner intuition yields no shape we also attempt to remedy this lack through analogies, and represent the temporal sequence through a line progressing to infinity, in which the manifold constitutes a series that is of only one dimension, and infer from the properties of this line to all the properties of time, with the sole difference that the parts of the former are simultaneous but those of the latter always exist successively. From this it is also apparent that the representation of time is itself an intuition, since all its relations can be expressed in an inner intuition.

c) Time is the a priori formal condition of all appearances in general. Space, as the pure form of all outer intuitions, is limited as an a priori condition merely to outer intuitions. But since, on the contrary, all representations, whether or not they have outer things as their object, nevertheless as determinations of the mind themselves belong to the inner state, while this inner state belongs under the formal condition of inner intuition, and thus of time, so time is an a priori condition of all appearance in general, and indeed the immediate condition of the inner intuition (of our souls), and thereby also the mediating condition of outer appearances. If I can say a priori: all outer appearances are space and determined a priori according to the relations of space, so from the principle of inner sense I can say entirely generally: all appearances in general, i.e., all objects of the senses, are in time, and necessarily stand in relations of time.

If we abstract from our way of internally intuing ourselves and by means of this intuition also dealing with all outer intuitions in the power of representation, and thus take objects as they may be in themselves, then time is nothing. It is only of objective validity in regard to appearances, because these are already things that we take as objects of our senses; but it is no longer objective if one abstracts from the sensibility of our intuition, thus from that kind of representation that is peculiar to us, and speaks of things in general. Time is therefore merely a subjective condition of our (human) intuition (which is always sensible, i.e., insofar as we are affected by objects), and in itself, outside the subject, is nothing. Nonetheless it is necessarily objective in regard to all appearances, thus also in regard to all things that can come before us in experience. We cannot say all things are in time, because with the concept of things in general abstraction is made from every kind of intuition of them, but this is the real condition under which time belongs to the representation of objects. Now if the condition is added to the concept, and the principle says that all things as appearances (objects of sensible intuition) are in time, then the principle has its sound objective correctness and a priori universality.

Our assertions accordingly teach the empirical reality of time, i.e., objective validity in regard to all objects that may ever be given to our senses. And since our intuition is always sensible, no object can ever be given to us in experience that would not belong under the condition of time. But, on the contrary, we dispose all claim of time as absolute reality, namely where it would attach to things absolutely as a condition or property even without regard to the form of our sensible intuition. Such properties, which pertain to things in themselves, can never be given to us through the senses. In this therefore consists the transcendental ideality of time, according to which it is nothing at all if one ab-
Doctrine of Elements. Part I. The Transcendental Aesthetic <B>

strachts from the subjective conditions of sensible intuition, and cannot
be counted as either subsisting or inhering in the objects in themselves
(without their relation to our intuition). Yet this ideality is to be com-
pared with the subreptions of sensation just as little as that of space is,
because in that case one presupposes that the appearance itself, in which
these predicates inhere, has objective reality, which is here entirely ab-
sent except insofar as it is merely empirical, i.e., the object itself is re-
garded merely as appearance: concerning which the above remark in the
previous sections is to be consulted. *

§ 7

Elucidation.

Against this theory, which concedes empirical reality to time but dis-
putes its absolute and transcendental reality, insightful men have so uni-
amously proposed one objection that I conclude that it must natu-
really occur to every reader who is not accustomed to these consid-
erations.31 It goes thus: Alterations are real (this is proved by the change of
our own representations, even if one would deny all outer appearances
together with their alterations). Now alterations are possible only in
time, therefore time is something real. There is no difficulty in an-
swering. I admit the entire argument. Time is certainly something real,
and it can be regarded as the real form of inner intuition. It therefore has subjective reality
in regard to inner experience, i.e., I really have the representation of
time and its determinations in it. It is therefore to be regarded re-
ally not as an object but as the way of representing myself as object.4 But
if I or another being could intuit myself without this condition of sensi-
bility, then these very determinations, which we now represent to our-
![image]

A 37

B 53

A 38

B 55

A 39

B 56

* I can, to be sure, say: my representations succeed one another; but that only
means that we are conscious of them in a temporal sequence, i.e., according
to the form of inner sense. Time is not on that account something in
itself, nor any determination objectively adhering to things.

* This refers to A 28–30/44–5 in § 3.
* In the first edition: “of my.”
* Object
* Object

* Object
* Principien
the entire theory of them useless and empty. The difference between an
indistinct and a distinct representation is merely logical, and does not
come into the content. Without doubt the concept of right that is used
by the healthy understanding contains the very same things that the
most subtle speculation can evolve out of it, only in common and prac-
tical use one is not conscious of these manifold representations in these
thoughts. Thus one cannot say that the common concept is sensible and
contains a mere appearance, for right cannot appear at all; rather its
concept lies in the understanding and represents a constitution (the
moral constitution) of actions that pertains to them in themselves. The
representation of a body in intuition, on the contrary, contains nothing
at all that could pertain to an object in itself, but merely the appearance
of something and the way in which we are affected by it; and this re-
cceptivity of our cognitive capacity is called sensibility and remains
worlds apart from the cognition of the object in itself even if one might
see through to the very bottom of it (the appearance).

The Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy has therefore directed all in-
vestigations of the nature and origin of our cognitions to an entirely unjust
point of view in considering the distinction between sensibility and the
intellectual as merely logical, since it is obviously transcendental, and
does not concern merely the form of distinctness or indistinctness, but
its origin and content, so that through sensibility we do not cognize the
constitution of things in themselves merely indistinctly, but rather not
at all, and, as soon as we take away our subjective constitution, the
represented object with the properties that sensible intuition attributes to
it is nowhere to be encountered, nor can it be encountered, for it is just
this subjective constitution that determines its form as appearance.

We ordinarily distinguish quite well between that which is essen-
tially attached to the intuition of appearances, and is valid for every human
sense in general, and that which pertains to them only contingently be-
cause it is not valid for the relation of sensibility in general but only for
a particular situation or organization of this or that sense. And thus one
calls the first cognition one that represents the object in itself, but the
second one only its appearance. This distinction, however, is only em-
pirical. If one stands by it (as commonly happens) and does not regard
that empirical intuition as in turn mere appearance (as ought to hap-
pen), so that there is nothing to be encountered in it that pertains to
anything in itself, then our transcendental distinction is lost, and we be-

As noted in the first-edition version above, here Kant switches from Verhältnis to
Beziehung as his topic switches from the relation of objects in space or time to each other
to the relation of space and time to us. With one exception to be noted, therefore, for
the remainder of this section (1) "relation" translates Verhältnis. In the new paragraphs
II through IV added below, however, Kant again reverts to Verhältnis.

Section II. On Time <B>

lieve ourselves to cognize things in themselves, though we have noth-
ing to do with anything except appearances anywhere (in the world of
sense), even in the deepest research into its objects. Thus, we would
certainly call a rainbow a mere appearance in a sun-shower, but would
call this rain the thing in itself, and this is correct, as long as we un-
derstand the latter concept in a merely physical sense, as that which in uni-
versal experience and all different positions relative to the senses is
always determined thus and not otherwise in intuition. But if we con-
sider this empirical object in general and, without turning to its agree-
ment with every human sense, ask whether it (not the raindrops, since
these, as appearances, are already empirical objects) represents an ob-
ject in itself, then the question of the relation of the representation to
the object is transcendental, and not only these drops are mere appear-
ances, but even their round form, indeed even the space through which
they fall are nothing in themselves, but only mere modifications or
foundations of our sensible intuition; the transcendental object, how-
ever, remains unknown to us.

The second important concern of our transcendental aesthetic is that
it not merely earn some favor as a plausible hypothesis, but that it be as
certain and indubitable as can ever be demanded of a theory that is to
serve as an organon. In order to make this certainty fully convincing we
will choose a case in which its validity can become obvious <and that
can serve to make that which has been added in § 3 even more clear>.

Thus, if it were to be supposed that space and time are in themselves
objective and conditions of the possibility of things in themselves, then
it would be shown, first, that there is a large number of a priori apodic-
tic and synthetic propositions about both, but especially about space,
which we will therefore here investigate as our primary example. Since
the propositions of geometry are cognized synthetically a priori and
with apodictic certainty, I ask: Whence do you take such propositions,
and on what does our understanding rely in attaining to such absolutely
necessary and universally valid truths? There is no other way than
through concepts or through intuitions, both of which, however, are
given, as such, either a priori or a posteriori. The latter, namely empirical
concepts, together with that on which they are grounded, empirical
intuition, cannot yield any synthetic proposition except one that is also
merely empirical, i.e., a proposition of experience; thus it can never
contain necessity and absolute universality of the sort that is neverthe-
less characteristic of all propositions of geometry. Concerning the first
and only means for attaining to such cognitions, however, namely

* Object
3 Grundlagen
4 Objecte
through mere concepts or a priori intuitions, it is clear that from mere concepts no synthetic cognition but only merely analytic cognition can be attained. Take the proposition that with two straight lines no space at all can be enclosed, thus no figure is possible, and try to derive it from the concept of straight lines and the number two; or take the proposition that a figure is possible with three straight lines, and in the same way try to derive it from these concepts. All of your effort is in vain, and you see yourself forced to take refuge in intuition, as indeed geometry always does. You thus give yourself an object in intuition; but what kind is this, is it a pure a priori intuition or an empirical one? If it were the latter, then no universally valid, let alone apodictic proposition could ever come from it; for experience can never provide anything of this sort. You must therefore give your object a priori in intuition, and ground your synthetic proposition on this. If there did not lie in you a faculty for intuiting a priori; if this subjective condition regarding form were not at the same time the universal a priori condition under which alone the object of this (outer) intuition is itself possible; if the object (the triangle) were something in itself without relation to your subject; then how could you say that what necessarily lies in your subjective conditions for constructing a triangle must also necessarily pertain to the triangle in itself? For you could not add to your concept (of three lines) something new (the figure) that must thereby necessarily be encountered in the object, since this is given prior to your cognition and not through it. If, therefore, space (and time as well) were not a mere form of your intuition that contains a priori conditions under which alone things could be outer objects for you, which are nothing in themselves without these subjective conditions, then you could make out absolutely nothing synthetic and a priori about outer objects. It is therefore indubitably certain and not merely possible or even probable that space and time, as the necessary conditions of all (outer and inner) experience, are merely subjective conditions of all our intuition, in relation to which therefore all objects are mere appearances and not things given for themselves in this way; about these appearances, further, much may be said a priori that concerns their form but nothing whatsoever about the things in themselves that may ground them.

II. For confirmation of this theory of the ideality of outer as well as inner sense, thus of all objects of the senses, as mere appearances, this comment is especially useful: that everything in our cognition that belongs to intuition (with the exception, therefore, of the feeling of pleasure and displeasure and the will, which are not cognitions at all) contains nothing but mere relations, of places in one intuition (extension), alteration of places (motion), and laws in accordance with which this alteration is determined (moving forces). But what is present in the place, or what it produces in the things themselves besides the alteration of place, is not given through these relations. Now through mere relations no thing in itself is cognized; it is therefore right to judge that since nothing is given to us through outer sense except mere representations of relation, outer sense can also contain in its representation only the relation of an object to the subject, and not that which is internal to the object in itself. It is exactly the same in the case of inner sense. It is not merely that the representations of outer sense make up the proper material with which we occupy our mind, but also the time in which we place these representations, which itself precedes the consciousness of them in experience and grounds the way in which we place them in mind as a formal condition, already contains relations of succession, of simultaneity, and of that which is simultaneous with succession (of that which persists). Now that which, as representation, can precede any act of thinking something is intuition and, if it contains nothing but relations, it is the form of intuition, which, since it does not represent anything except insofar as something is posited in the mind, can be nothing other than the way in which the mind is affected by its own activity, namely this positing of its representation, thus the way it is affected through itself, i.e., it is an inner sense as far as regards its form. Everything that is represented through a sense is to that extent always appearance, and an inner sense must therefore either not be admitted at all or else the subject, which is the object of this sense, can only be represented by its means as appearance, not as it would judge of itself if its intuition were mere self-activity, i.e., intellectual. Any difficulty in this depends merely on the question how a subject can internally intuit itself; yet this difficulty is common to every theory. Consciousness of itself (apercception) is the simple representation of the I, and if all of the manifold in the subject were given self-actively through that alone, then the inner intuition would be intellectual. In human beings this consciousness requires inner perception of the manifold that is antecedently given in the subject, and the manner in which this is given in the mind without spontaneity must be called sensibility on account of this difference. If the faculty for becoming conscious of oneself is to seek out (apprehend) that which lies in the mind, it must affect the lat-s

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4 Object
5 Objecte

Here Kant reverts to the use of Verhältnis for the remainder of the "Transcendental Aesthetic," and it is thus this word that is translated by "relation" here and for the remainder of the section unless otherwise noted.

6 Objecte
ter, and it can only produce an intuition of itself in such a way, whose form, however, which antecedently grounds it in the mind, determines the way in which the manifold is together in the mind in the representation of time; there it then intuits itself not as it would immediately self-actively represent itself, but in accordance with the way in which it is affected from within, consequently as it appears to itself, not as it is.

III. If I say: in space and time intuition represents both outer objects as well as the self-intuition of the mind as each affects our senses, i.e., as it appears, that is not to say that these objects would be a mere illusion. For in the appearance the objects, indeed even properties that we attribute to them, are always regarded as something really given, only insofar as this property depends only on the kind of intuition of the subject in the relation of the given object to it then this object as appearance is to be distinguished from itself as object in itself. Thus I do not say that bodies merely seem to exist outside me or that my soul only seems to be given if I assert that the quality of space and time—in accordance with which, as condition of their existence, I posit both of these—lies in my kind of intuition and not in these objects in themselves. It would be my own fault if I made that which I should count as appearance into mere illusion. But this does not happen according to

"The predicates of appearance can be attributed to the object in itself, in relation to our sense, e.g., the red color or fragrance to the rose; but the illusion can never be attributed to the object as predicate, precisely because that would be to attribute to the object for itself what pertains to it only in relation to the senses or in general to the subject, e.g., the two handles that were originally attributed to Saturn. What is not to be encountered in the object in itself at all, but is always to be encountered in its relation to the subject and is inseparable from the representation of the object, is appearance, and thus the predicates of space and of time are rightly attributed to the objects of the senses as such, and there is no illusion in this. On the contrary, if I attribute the redness to the rose in itself, the handles to Saturn or extension to all outer objects in themselves, without looking to a determinate relation of these objects to the subject and limiting my judgment to this, then illusion first arises.

It is also not necessary for us to limit the kind of intuition in space and time to the sensibility of human beings; it may well be that all finite thinking beings must necessarily agree with human beings in this regard (though we cannot decide this), yet even given such universal validity this kind of intuition would not cease to be sensibility, for the very reason that it is derived (intuitus derivatus), not original (intuitus origi-
Doctrine of Elements. Part I. The Transcendental Aesthetic <B>

Thus not intellectual intuition, which for the ground already adduced seems to pertain only to the original being, never to one that is dependent as regards both its existence and its intuition (which determines its existence in relation to given objects); although the last remark must be counted only as an illustration of our aesthetic theory and not as a ground of its proof.

Conclusion of the Transcendental Aesthetic.

Here we now have one of the required pieces for the solution of the general problem of transcendental philosophy - how are synthetic <i>a priori</i> propositions possible? - namely pure <i>a priori</i> intuitions, space and time, in which, if we want to go beyond the given concept in an <i>a priori</i> judgment, we encounter that which is to be discovered <i>a priori</i> and synthetically connected with it, not in the concept but in the intuition that corresponds to it; but on this ground such a judgment never extends beyond the objects of the senses and can hold only for objects of possible experience.

* original intuition
* Beziehung
* Objekte
* Objekte

The Transcendental Doctrine of Elements

Second Part

The Transcendental Logic

Introduction

The Idea of a Transcendental Logic

I.

On logic in general.

Our cognition arises from two fundamental sources in the mind, the first of which is the reception of representations (the receptivity of impressions), the second the faculty for cognizing an object by means of these representations (spontaneity of concepts); through the former an object is given to us, through the latter it is thought in relation to that representation (as a mere determination of the mind). Intuition and concepts therefore constitute the elements of all our cognition, so that neither concepts without intuition corresponding to them in some way nor intuition without concepts can yield a cognition. Both are either pure or empirical. Empirical, if sensation (which presupposes the actual presence of the object) is contained therein; but pure if no sensation is mixed into the representation. One can call the latter the matter of sensible cognition. Thus pure intuition contains merely the form under which something is intuited, and pure concept only the form of thinking of an object in general. Only pure intuitions or concepts alone are possible <i>a priori</i>, empirical ones only <i>a posteriori</i>.

If we will call the receptivity of our mind to receive representations insofar as it is affected in some way sensibility, then on the contrary the faculty for bringing forth representations itself, or the spontaneity of cognition, is the understanding. It comes along with our nature that intuition can never be other than sensible, i.e., that it contains only the way in which we are affected by objects. The faculty for thinking of objects of sensible intuition, on the contrary, is the understanding. Neither of these properties is to be preferred to the other. Without sensibility no object would be given to us, and without understanding none would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions

* The second edition has the plural verb <i>können</i>, the first had the singular <i>kann</i>.